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Article 6

A Sublime Death: Shock and Awe
By Olivia L. Moskot
Abstract: Death has the almost paradoxical capacity to appear larger than life. It chills with its
permanence and astonishes as it stands before us—great, terrible, and vast beyond
comprehension. The obscurity of death cries out for grief to answer, and it is that very
sensation of astonishment that triggers and also lingers over the process of grief that has
gone unexamined for too long. I believe there is a familiar name to put to that sensation
that will aid future research. That is, we may be justified in calling that sensation awe. In
this paper, I thoroughly examine the relationship between death, grief, and the experience
of awe and ultimately argue that understanding the power of death to leave the living
struck with awe has the potential to change how we respond to our own grief as well as
the grief of others. Rather than perceiving grief as a disease or infliction that we fear we
will never recover from, or some kind of proof of irrationality leaving us feeling horribly
unqualified to revive ourselves, grief becomes a call to expand the mind and turn
outward. When one comes to accept and appreciate the role of awe as a natural response
to the large, obscure, powerful nature of death, and the subsequent grieving process as a
process of accommodation, it becomes evident that healthy, rational grief does not
demand that we forsake our loved ones, but rather it invites us to broaden the conception
of our loved ones as well as ourselves.
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Death has the almost paradoxical capacity to appear larger than life. It chills with its
permanence and astonishes as it stands before us—great, terrible, and vast beyond
comprehension. The obscurity of death cries out for grief to answer. It is that very
sensation of astonishment that triggers and also lingers over the process of grief that
I believe has gone unexamined for too long. I believe there is a familiar name to put
to that sensation that will aid future research. That is, we may be justified in calling
that sensation awe. The phenomenon of awe is surprisingly under researched, its
study usually confined to aesthetic and religious scholarship. Even psychological
research pertaining to awe is lamentably sparse. Dacher Keltner, however, has been
involved in publishing psychological research pertaining to awe since 2003, and I
find his work is indispensable when examining the complexity of awe.
Keltner describes awe as an emotion triggered by a stimulus so vast that it
requires accommodation.1From this, we understand, first, that awe is an emotion
triggered by encountering something vast. Later, I will suggest that this vastness
can be either physical (like a towering mountain) or conceptual (like the idea of
infinity). Second, we come to understand that the vastness triggering the
experience of awe must be profound enough to require processing. In other words,
the triggering stimulus the subject encounters will (and must) require her to adjust
her frame of mind in order to make room for the reality of its existence. This
adjustment period is what Keltner refers to as accommodation. Altogether, a vast
stimulus that requires accommodation is the impetus for awe. In this essay, I will
argue that death, particularly the death of a loved one, is a stimulus vast enough to
require the accommodation process that is grief.
I will not be the first to consider grief a form of accommodation—Berislav
Marušić and George A. Bonanno use the concept of accommodation to explore
grief as well. Marušić describes grief as a rejection of death, which lessens as one
comes to accept the loss of a significant other. According to his account, it is
through grief that a person accommodates, or makes room for, the reality of
death.2 And Bonanno suggests that “our reactions to grief seem designed to help
us accept and accommodate losses. . . so that we can continue to live productive
lives.” 3 These strike me as particularly apt insights, but neither Marušić nor
Bonanno considers that a large portion of grief’s process is our overcoming the
shock and lingering awe into which death casts us. This is precisely what I will be
investigating through this essay: the role of death as a vast stimulus that propels
affected individuals into a state of awe, which grief attempts to accommodate. In
the coming sections, I will show how and why death can be considered a vast
stimulus and also how understanding grief as doing the work of ‘awe
management’ changes our understanding of the grieving process as a whole. I will
then examine two first hand accounts of death and grief that demonstrate how this
new insight into the interplay of grief and awe could influence the ways in which
we talk about death. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that awe is the only
1

Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic
Emotion,” Cognition and Emotion 17, no. 2 (2003): pp. 297-298.
2
Marušić, Berislav. “Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief.” Philosophers' Imprint 18: 1, 2018: 2
3
George A Bonanno, The Other Side of Sadness: What the New Science of Bereavement Tells Us
About Life After Loss (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019), 8.
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emotion at work within the grieving process, but I am directing attention toward
its integral role in grief and proposing that paying heed to such will lead to a more
well-rounded understanding of grief.
If one is to accept that a person becomes awe-struck when encountering a
vast enough stimulus, she ought to first know what is meant by the term ‘vast.’
What does it mean, in this context, for a stimulus to be vast? And what, more
specifically, makes the death of a loved one a vast stimulus? Colloquially, one
tends to understand vastness in terms of physical broadness or largeness, and
these qualities transfer fairly directly to the awe-specific usage of the word.
Keltner and Haidt state that vastness “refers to anything that is experienced as
being much larger than the self, or the self’s ordinary level of experience or frame
of reference.” In these words, vastness reads like Edmund Burke’s notion of the
sublime, which is widely recognized as the “most systematic early treatment of an
awe-like aesthetic emotion.”4 Thinking of vastness in terms of the sublime comes
with benefits. For example, if vastness and Burkean sublimity are, for all intents
and purposes, synonymous concepts, then we can use what we know about
Burke’s sublime to inform our notion of vastness. When Keltner and Haidt note
that power and obscurity are particularly important to Burke’s idea of the sublime
in that they “endow stimuli with the capacity to produce the sublime experience,” 5
we can take that to mean power and obscurity are also facets of that which we
consider to be vast.
It is also worth considering whether people, generally speaking, might
associate other less obvious facets of the Burkean sublime with awe provoking
stimuli. That is, what goes into making something feel vast may not have anything
to do with largeness at all. For instance, Burke also asserts that nature, literature,
and art are the types of stimuli that most often arouse awe. And this suggestion
seems to be consistent with current research that suggests that awe is “relatively
asocial” and most often “elicited by information-rich stimuli, particularly
panoramic nature views and novel art and music.”6 This means that awe-inspiring
stimuli can often be aesthetically provocative rather than simply tall or wide. As
mentioned in the introduction of this piece, something can be physically vast and
incite awe, but something can be conceptually vast and produce the same effect.
To better understand how something conceptual can produce feelings of
vastness, one can turn to a philosophical distinction made by Immanuel Kant and
expounded upon by Friedrich Schiller. Kant proposes two distinct types of
sublimity that Schiller characterizes in terms of the theoretical and the practical:
The theoretical sublime presents nature as an object of knowledge and
indicates that we “can think more than we know”; it describes for
instance the mixture of fear and awe we experience when conceptualizing
infinity… The practically sublime, by contrast, concerns nature as an
object of feeling, specifically as a source of danger and fear.7
Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Approaching Awe, pp. 300.
Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Approaching Awe, pp. 300-301.
6
Michelle N. Shiota, Dacher Keltner, and Amanda Mossman, “The Nature of Awe: Elicitors,
Appraisals, and Effects on Self-Concept,” Cognition and Emotion 21, no. 5 (July 19, 2007): pp.
950.
7
Stanford encyclopedia
4
5
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From this, and various passages in Schiller’s essay “Of the Sublime,” readers can
gather that that which is theoretically sublime provokes the feeling that something
is a conceptual threat while that which is practically sublime evokes the feeling
that something is a physical threat. But sublimity, which we are considering
synonymous with the type of vastness that inspires awe, cannot be conjured by
something that simply poses a threat to us. No, we must be able to experience the
threatening stimulus from a place of safety. As Schiller puts it, “Inner mental
freedom is absolutely required in order to find the fearful sublime and to have
pleasure in it…we must consider ourselves secure, if the fearful is to please us.”8
Thus we see, sublimity is distinct from terror in that one is able to preserve a
sense of mental freedom and, therefore, security in the face of an otherwise fearinducing stimulus in the case of the former but not the latter. Again, from
investigating and employing Schiller's work in this section, we remember that
there are two types of things that can produce the sublime: physical and
conceptual threats. When considering these ideas in terms of vastness, the
language shifts only slightly. That which is vast enough to inspire awe must be
physically or conceptually ‘large’ enough to pose a threat while still being
conquerable by one’s mental faculties.
With this focus on terror, it may be even more complicated to truly
comprehend conceptual vastness, particularly in terms of art, music, and
literature. Perhaps it may help to bring the example of infinity back into the
picture. Infinity feels threatening as a concept that is unconquerable by the human
mind. Art, music, and literature can contain similar unconquerable, mind-blowing
characteristics. From the chills induced by a simple chord progression to a
painting that brings us to tears,9 the aesthetic world has a strong foothold in that
which is strangely, beautifully vast. On this note, René Descartes said “When our
first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel—i.e. very
different from what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it should be—
this brings it about that we wonder… and are astonished at it.” 10 Conceptual
vastness such as this can be just as difficult, if not more difficult, to reckon with
than physical vastness. Even if something can be overcome by one’s mental
faculties it does not necessarily follow that the conquest will be simple or easy.
Hence the need for an accommodation process.
Without accommodating for the initial shock of the vast stimulus one has
encountered, it is possible for an experience to remain fearful or confused in the
mind of the beholder and never fully transform into something worthwhile or
awesome. Consider walking from one end of a wide canyon to the other on a
tempered glass bridge. For some, the experience would be simply terrifying. For
others, the experience would be thrilling. One of the many causes of the disparity
in reactions, even in the face of the same stimulus, is the different mental states of
8

Schiller 93
Ivo Strecker and Markus Verne. 2013. Astonishment and Evocation the Spell of Culture in Art
and Anthropology. 1st ed. New York: Berghahn Books: 13. While this paper does not explore the
relationship between art and awe, Strecker and Verne take on this question in depth—and they do
go further into the complex circumstances that lead to emotional responses to art such as those
aforementioned.
10
René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul (Jonathan Bennett, 2017).
9
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the individuals. Those unable to overcome their feelings of fear may feel that they
have no control or security in the face of what they perceive to be a great physical
threat. Those who can lean into their mental faculties and ascertain the likelihood
of their safety in the presence of the threat will likely be more able to negotiate
their way beyond the fear toward a more holistic interpretation of the situation
both emotionally and menatlly. From all of this, we better understand how an
experience can be sublime or vast, and even how individual responses to vast
stimuli can vary. But what, more specifically, makes death a vast stimulus?
Death, while ordinary enough as a concept, could not be further from
ordinary experientially. While it’s true that many people are informed at a
relatively early age that all living things eventually die, the actual experience of
death (particularly facing the reality of one’s own impending death or facing the
actual death of a loved one) carries with it an enormous emotional and existential
toll. And while most everyone encounters death regularly enough through news
clippings, literature, and film—here again, it is the concept of death that one
encounters, rather than the experience. Even as one cries real, sympathy-laden
tears over the pages of a Nicholas Sparks novel, one need only turn back to the
book’s beginning to find the heroine restored to perfect health. If the obituaries
generate feelings of sadness, one can always find the comics nearby. However,
when one has experienced the real laughter and hugs of a loved one before the
occurrence of their death, there is no comic relief powerful enough to wipe their
name from memory nor any pages one can return to that contain the loving touch
of their hand. So, while the concept of death may lurk casually enough among
humankind, a real-life, personal encounter with death forces all to acknowledge
its true power—a power which is absolutely vast enough to inspire awe in even
the most callous of us. Thus, our need to mentally accommodate for the vast
stimulus that is death—in other words, the need to grieve.
This brings us to what is entailed within the concept of accommodation.
The word ‘accommodate,’ as it is used in awe theory, “refers to the Piagetian
process of adjusting mental structures that cannot assimilate a new experience.”11
This appears in descriptions of awe when one is confronted with something that is
just too much for her to comprehend. Yet, there it is. And so, she must find a way
to take in or comprehend it. This powerful, obscure thing, whatever it might be,
“triggers the sense that one’s default schema needs to be updated.” 12 How one
goes about updating this schema is not likely to look the same for any two
individuals, but, regardless of the approach, it will require increasing one’s
openness to new positions or possibilities. For example, Piercarlo Valdesolo and
Jesse Graham’s empirical research on awe show that those who were confronted
with an awe-eliciting stimulus experienced a “decreased tolerance for uncertainty,
which, in turn, increased [their] tendency to believe in nonhuman agents and to
perceive human agency in random events.” 13 This research may explain why
Michelle N. Shiota, Dacher Keltner, and Amanda Mossman, “The Nature of Awe: Elicitors,
Appraisals, and Effects on Self-Concept,” Cognition and Emotion 21, no. 5 (July 19, 2007): 304.
12
Paul K. Piff et al., “Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 108, no. 6 (2015): pp. 896.
13
Piercarlo Valdesolo and Jesse Graham, “Awe, Uncertainty, and Agency Detection,”
Psychological Science 25, no. 1 (2014): pp. 170.
11
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religion is one of the two areas that have produced the most scholarship on awe as
well as research on why grief, as an accommodation process for a specific aweinducing stimulus, seems as complicated and ambiguous as it does. Altogether,
we gather that accommodation is about making room for ideas and emotions that
are too much for us when we initially encounter them. How one goes about
making that room, or expanding one’s self, will vary from person to person and
from situation to situation. But, whatever the specifics end up being,
accommodation will involve reaching out for some sort of answer to bridge the
gap between one’s current state of mind and the vast stimulus challenging that
state. When a person succeeds in making room for a vast stimulus, the feeling of
shock and awe begins to wane.
It may be true, however, that a person sometimes will not appropriately
accommodate for a vast stimulus and instead will just gradually acquire enough
distance between themselves and the stimulus that they are able to distract
themselves or forget about the triggering stimulus for some time. This may
account for why some people experience grief in what is so often referred to as
‘waves.’ In this case, the accommodation necessary to make room for the shock
and devastation of death did not take place completely. Thus, when one reencounters the memories of a loved one who has passed, for example, they also
re-encounter the shock and awe of that person’s death because they have not yet
mentally and/or emotionally made room for the magnitude of that experience.
This process of experiencing grief in waves may repeat itself until some sort of
accommodation has been made. Once a person has accommodated for the shock
and awe of a loss, they will likely still experience a diversity of emotions at the
memory of their lost loved one, but I argue that they will also likely feel that the
grieving process does have some sort of conclusion—personal and messy though
it may be.
Up until this point of the essay, I have set up one of the more prominent
psychological discussions of ‘awe’ and have proposed how death and grief might
fit into that framework. And, after this, it may seem plain to the point of
uninteresting that awe plays a significant role within the phenomenon of death
and grief. Nevertheless, it remains true that the relationship between awe, death
and grief has gone unexamined until now, not only within scholarship but also
within death and grief narratives. However, the latter may only be true in name as,
through my own narrative readings on death and grief, I have seen the presence of
awe time and again appear prominently. Though these narrative authors do not
call what they are experiencing by its name, what they are describing often fits
into the definition of awe. To demonstrate my findings, I will take readers through
passages from the personal accounts of grief written by C. S. Lewis and Simone
de Beauvoir. First, showing how these authors, even if unintentionally, portray
death as vast, and, then, second, how they describe grief as a sort of
accommodation. To be vast in this particular use of the word, readers will
remember, is to be large, powerful, and obscure enough to require
accommodation.
In the very first line of C.S. Lewis’ reflections on the loss of his wife in A
Grief Observed, there appear descriptive words one might associate with the
experience of the vast or sublime. There, Lewis writes, “No one ever told me that
45

grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid, but the sensation is like being afraid.”14 The
language in this line indicates that Lewis is feeling a sense of submissiveness to
death—its vastness has made him afraid or at least something like afraid. The
ambiguity of what exactly he is feeling points to the obscurity of grief, as well.
So, here, in the very first line of the account, readers already see Lewis
associating the stimulus of his wife’s death with the power and confusion inherent
to that which generates awe and requires accommodation.
Furthermore, Lewis not only describes experiences with his wife’s death
in terms commensurate with vastness, but also compares them to stimuli more
commonly reported to induce awe, such as those found in nature or art. Lewis
writes “I look up at the night sky. Is anything more certain than that in all those
vast times and spaces, if I were allowed to search them, I should nowhere find her
face, her voice, her touch?”15 Here, Lewis not only actually uses the word vast to
describe the emotional response he had to the loss of his wife, but he also directly
points to feelings of obscurity and mystery contained within that loss through the
imagery of the night sky (which implicitly includes the vastness of
eternity/infinity). He uses nature imagery to convey the darkness and endlessness
provoked by the death of his wife, clearly demonstrating the state of
dumbfoundedness in which the vast stimulus of death has left him. And,
remembering that people “typically experience awe in response to asocial stimuli
like natural wonders, panoramic views, and beautiful art,”16 one can clearly see
Lewis illustrating the phenomenon of awe through the above passage even
without naming it. And this is not the only passage in which Lewis describes grief
through metaphors that take readers to a traditional Burkean expression of the
sublime. Lewis states that grief is “like a long valley, a winding valley where any
bend may reveal a totally new landscape.”17 And, evoking within his readers the
feelings of shock and confusion that his wife’s death has caused him to feel
through reference to the arts, he writes, “we think of [death] as love cut short; like
a dance stopped in mid-career or a flower with its head unluckily snapped off—
something truncated and therefore, lacking its due shape.”18 With a reminder from
Kelter and Haidt that “the most common experience of awe for contemporary
Westerners in egalitarian societies is the response to natural and human-made
objects,”19 it is no wonder that Lewis represents the vastness of death through
such images as these.
Simone de Beauvoir also alludes to the vastness of death through her
narrative depicting the difficult and emotional end of her mother’s life. Consider,
for instance, the following passage:
[I]t was when I was at her bedside that I saw Death, the Death of the
dance of death, with its bantering grin, the Death of fireside tales that
14

C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994): 3.
C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994): 15. My emphasis.
16
Paul K. Piff et al., “Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 108, no. 6 (2015): pp. 883.
17
C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994): 60. My emphasis
18
Ibid., 49-50. My emphasis
19
Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic
Emotion,” Cognition and Emotion 17, no. 2 (2003): pp. 309.
15
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knocks on the door, a scythe in its hand, the Death that comes from
elsewhere, strange and inhuman: it had the very face of Maman when
she showed her gums in a wide smile of unknowingness.20

Here, Beauvoir not only portrays death as a figure who dances and tells stories—
both actions being references to the arts—but she also capitalizes the first letter of
‘Death.’ This act of deification simply and swiftly adds power, obscurity, and
religiosity to her portrayal of death. All of this together creates an overall
characterization of a sublime death—artistic, animate, obscure, and powerful.
What’s more, in describing her mother’s relationship to death before its
eventuality, Beauvoir states:
She clung ferociously to this world, and she had an animal dread of
death. She had told my sister of a nightmare that she often had. ‘I
am being chased: I run, I run, and I come up against a wall; I had
to jump over this wall, and I do not know what there is behind it; it
terrifies me.’21

Beauvoir brings in nature imagery again in this passage, describing her mother as
having an animalistic fear of death and a ferocious cling[ing] to life. And, through
the imagery of the wall, her mother’s nightmare reveals how terribly large death
seems to her, the other side of death left completely obscure. Through these
passages, and those from C.S. Lewis, readers see death characterized as sublime
and vast enough that it inevitably calls for mental accommodation. Again, this
accommodation is necessary because the death of the loved one is such a massive
happening that one cannot possibly comprehend it with their current mental
apparatus.
As mentioned previously, accommodation can be a rigorous and
complicated ordeal. Imagine, for instance, when a child attempts to put a square
peg into a triangular hole. When the square doesn’t fit, the child might believe
that the peg is somehow broken, that the peg is simply at the wrong angle, that he
isn’t applying enough pressure on the peg, that he needs a different set of holes
altogether, or that the peg was never meant to go into a hole at all… the list could
go on. This is not unlike the accommodation process that a vast, awe-inspiring
stimulus requires a person to undergo. The often clumsy nature of this process is
evident in the following passage from Lewis in which he refers to his late wife by
the initial H.
‘Where is she now?’ That is, in what place is she at the present time? …if
H. is not a body—and the body I loved is certainly no longer she—she is
in no place at all. And ‘the present time’ is a date or point in our time
series… If the dead are not in time, or not in our sort of time, is there any
clear difference, when we speak of them, between was and is and will be?
Kind people have said to me, ‘She is with God.’ In one sense that is most
certain. She is, like God, incomprehensible and unimaginable.22

Here, it is clear that Lewis is attempting to accommodate for the discrepancy
20

Simone de Beauvoir, A Very Easy Death, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1964): 105. My emphasis
21
Simone de Beauvoir, A Very Easy Death, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1964): 15.
22
C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994): 23. Original emphasis.
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between his late wife’s existence and her new absence, but the accommodation
does not come easily or immediately. One might even argue that it does not occur
at all. Nevertheless, effort toward accommodation, whether successful or not, is
necessary, for H. no longer exists in time as she had before death. To understand
H. and time as they relate to each other now requires accommodation.
Furthermore, Lewis’ own experience with time has also changed as a result of the
death. He says, “Up till this I always had too little time. Now there is nothing but
time. Almost pure time, empty successiveness.” 23 Both Lewis’ thoughts on his
wife’s timelessness as well as his own new relationship with time seem
demonstrative of a state of shock and symptomatic of a state of awe. To this point,
empirical research by Melanie Rudd, Kathleen D. Vohs, and Jennifer Aaker
shows that “awe offset[s] the feeling that time is limited.”24 And this is extremely
evident in this particular passage of Lewis. After all, between Lewis and his wife,
one with all of the time in the world and the other without time entirely, how is
accommodation ever to occur?
Time is not the only concept that becomes obscured by the astonished,
hazy state in which H.’s death has left Lewis. In fact, Lewis goes as far as to
question humanity itself as he struggles toward accommodation:
If H. ‘is not,’ then she never was. I mistook a cloud of atoms for a
person. There aren’t, and never were, any people. Death only reveals the
vacuity that was always there. What we call the living are simply those
who have not yet been unmasked. All equally bankrupt, but some not yet
declared. But this must be nonsense; vacuity revealed to whom?
Bankruptcy declared to whom? To other boxes of fireworks or clouds of
atoms. I will never believe… that one set of physical events could be, or
make, a mistake about other sets.25

Readers see here that Lewis begins again with a struggle to accommodate, or the
sense of timelessness death has caused him to experience, with the negotiation of
present and past tense—her absence in the present erases her presence in the past.
This frustration with accommodating for the disruption of time, thus leads to an
upset in the very fabric of his universe. Lewis doubts the reality, or at least the
substantive nature, of all living beings. And then, just as swiftly, he doubts his
carefully constructed doubts. Lewis even goes as far as to re-evaluate that which
is most fundamental to his sense of being, in his quest to accommodate the death
of his wife, writing: “Sooner or later I must face the question in plain language.
What reason have we, except our own desperate wishes, to believe that God is, by
any standard we can conceive, ‘good’? Doesn’t all the prima facie evidence
suggest exactly the opposite?”26 Those familiar with the works of C.S. Lewis are
also familiar with his deep religious convictions, making the pervasive,
permeating nature of the accommodation process that much more striking. One
might read and wonder, what does it take for a person going through grief to
achieve transformative or fruitful accommodation? Or, for that matter, what does
23

Ibid., 33.
Melanie Rudd, Kathleen D. Vohs, and Jennifer Aaker, “Awe Expands People’s Perception of
Time, Alters Decision Making, and Enhances Well-Being,” Psychological Science 23, no. 10
(August 10, 2012): pp. 1135.
25
C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994): 28-29.
26
Ibid., 30.
24

48

it take for a person to accommodate for the death of a loved one at all?
To this, both Simone de Beauvoir and C.S. Lewis offer what seem to be
optimistic passages that suggest accommodation (at least of some sort) is possible.
Beauvoir writes:
With my father I had stayed by him until the time he became a mere
thing for me: I tamed the transition between presence and the void. With
Maman I went away almost immediately after having kissed her, and
that was why it seemed to me that it was still her that was lying, all
alone, in the cold of the mortuary.27

Accommodating for the death of her father may have been easier for
Beauvoir than accommodating for the death of her mother because she had more
information and experience with her father’s death by means of her presence and
time. Studies show that those who encounter awe elicitors (such as the death of a
loved one, in this case) may experience increased motivation to take in new
information so as to better update their mental frameworks.28 Thus, it may be the
case that the more information one has, the more likely she will be to successfully
accommodate for the awe-triggering stimulus. Another method of accommodating
for grief may be turning outward. We see what this might look like in the
following passage:
…comparatively speaking, her death was an easy one. ‘Don’t leave
me in the power of the brutes.’ I thought of all those who have no
one to make that appeal to: what agony it must be to feel oneself a
defenceless thing, utterly at the mercy of indifferent doctors and
overly worked nurses. No hand on the forehead when terror seizes
them; no sedative as soon as pain begins to tear them; no lying
prattle to fill the silence of the void.29
Here, we see Beauvoir sympathizing with others, people with whom she does not
even have a personal connection. She turns her grief outward to those she knows
exist in the world alongside her and suffer a somehow worse death than her
mother. Paul K. Piff et al. state that “by diminishing the emphasis on the
individual self, awe may encourage people to forego strict self-interest to improve
the welfare of others.” 30 And when they do, it may be that they achieve
accommodation through a broadening of their perspective. Their pain is only a
small percentage of the pain in the world. Their loss is only one of many losses.
And, thus, through this realization, their mental framework expands and there is
room to perceive the loss they have experienced—at least in some small way.
After all, it is not possible that any one of us should ever entirely
understand death—at least, not on this side of mortality. This does not mean,
however, that accommodation is a lost cause. Take into consideration how Lewis
27

Simone de Beauvoir, A Very Easy Death, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1964): 97.
28
Paul K. Piff et al., “Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 108, no. 6 (2015): pp. 896.
29
Simone de Beauvoir, A Very Easy Death, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1964): 94.
30
Paul K. Piff et al., “Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 108, no. 6 (2015): pp. 897.
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ends his own narrative on grief as he imagines wherever his wife might be. He
imagines her in a sort of heaven with a comforting religious figure and writes:
“She said not to me but to the chaplain, ‘I am at peace with God.’ She smiled, but
not at me. Poi si torno all’ eterna fontana.” 31 This is a beautiful, touching
example of the kind of accommodation that is possible when confronted with the
aweful, sublime death of a loved one. If full knowledge about the stimuli that
triggered the awe process is necessary for full accommodation to occur, then the
accommodation process of grief may be doomed to fail. But it doesn’t seem that
this is at all what is required. After all, what Lewis offers in this final passage of
his book is not full knowledge, but evidence that a transition has occurred even in
the absence of full knowledge. He makes peace with his God. He grants his wife
the independence in her death that she would very likely wish for him in his
continued life on Earth. And, above all, Lewis has turned outward in his grief as
Beauvoir turned outward in her own. Lewis imagined that his wife was smiling a
smile that was no longer for him, but for herself and the other inhabitants of
heaven. Even his imaginings were turning outward. Thus, he ends his narrative
with a quote from Dante’s Divine Comedy: “‘Then she turned herself back toward
the eternal fountain.’”32 Lewis never turns away from his wife, but allows her to
turn away from him and toward whatever it is that eternity might be.
Understanding the power of death to leave the living struck with awe has
the potential to change how we respond to our own grief as well as the grief of
others. We can understand the shock as a natural response to the large, obscure,
powerful nature of death. And we can understand the grieving process as a
process of accommodation. Rather than grief being a disease that we fear we will
never recover from, or some kind of proof of irrationality leaving us feeling
horribly unqualified to revive ourselves, grief becomes a call to expand the mind
and turn outward. It does not demand that we forsake our loved ones, but rather it
invites us to broaden our conception of our loved ones as well as ourselves. While
the implications of awe being an ever-present part of the death and grieving
experience require far more insight and research than what I have begun to do
through this article, it appears to me that awe promises to illuminate grief
scholarship in promising new ways and offer new hope where hope otherwise
seemed lost.
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